The purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of a steady state for a simple decentralized growth model which is subject to random shocks. The model has the following elements. The population is composed of an endless sequence of overlapping cohorts of two-period households; each cohort is the same size; and, there is an aggregate production function and one output good. Because the labor supply is fixed, the production function relates output in each period t to the total saving of all young families in period t -1 and to the current realization zt of a random variable Z: The random variable has an exogenous, unchanging, and known distribution. Futures markets are imperfect: young families can save at time t only by investing in physical capital, which will pay a return at time t + 1. The return depends on the size of the time-(t + 1) capital stock, k,, and on zl+ r. Let y, = y(k,-1, zt) be the vector of incomes of young families at time t. Then such families use a function g( vf) = k, to predict k, (note that g is nonstochastic). The families adjust their saving to maximize their expected utility, where the latter is computed using g and the distribution function for 5. We call resulting aggregate savings by young families y(y,, g).
appearance for states in any Bore1 subset A c Ei. States in K* -(Q'=, Ei) are transitory, leading to entrance into some Ei after a finite number of periods with probability 1.
The novelty of our analysis lies in our ability to characterize u solely on the basis of restrictions on family preference orderings and the aggregate production function.' Our work can be viewed as a complement to Mirman's [ 14, 15 ] competitive analysis and to Brock and Mirman's [4] optimal growth model. Mirman's papers postulate the existence of an aggregative saving function with various properties; Brock and Mirman derive such a function from a model with a single, centraliy controlled maximization process. In this paper, utility maximization on the part of individual families leads to an overall saving function.*
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section I presents the assumptions of our model. Section II proves the existence of an equilibrium transition function u (in other words, the existence of a transition function consistent with rational expectations on the part of all families and zero excess demand in each period). Our proof is somewhat involved because we need u to have strong enough properties to establish the existence of a steady state in Section III. A mathematical appendix at the end of the paper supplies proofs for all lemmas and propositions.
I. THE MODEL
We first present our basic assumptions about preferences and production. Then we list several special restrictions needed for particular steps in this paper. At the end of this section we prove two lemmas which we will use to construct an invariant set [kL, k,] c (0, co) for values of the aggregate capital stock.
We assume that at each time t the population of the economy consists of an equal number of young and old families. The number remains fixed over time. Although the population is finite, we assume that it is so large that with no discernible influence on its own well-being each individual family can behave as though its saving decision will not affect the next-period wage rate and rate of return on capital. The families in each cohort are indexed with numbers j E { l,..., J). Each family j has a utility function u(c, , c2 ,j) with c, ' See, in consumption in the first period of life and c2 consumption in the second. The family's endowment consists of a supply of "effective" labor units in each period of life, (/r(j), Z,(j)). We assume that the number of families of each type (4); 4(4 MN remains the same generation after generation. We also assume I,(j) > 0 and I,(j) > 0 each j. We want U: R2 x { 1 ,..., .I) -+ R to have the following properties in every case: (Al) For each (cl, c2) E (0, co) x (0, a~), u is twice continuous/y differentiable in c, and c2, limCl,, ~r(c, c,,j) = limCi, u2(c,, c, j) = 00, U,(Cl,c2,j) > 0, ~~(c,,c,,j) > 0, ~,~(c~,c~,j)>O, and u is concave in c, and c2.
Any utility function U: R2 + R of the Bergson class, for example, would satisfy (A 1).
Let k, be the total saving of all young families at time t. Since the total supply of "effective" labor units is unvarying, production next period, ql+ 1, can be written
where z,+r is a random realization of Z: This formulation is consistent with the spirit of Mirman's [ 14, 151 and Brock and Mirman's [4] familiar analyses. We assume that z1 all t represent random samplings from Z; that z1 E R all t, and that (A2) There exists an interval Z = [z,, z,] c (--co, 00) with !', P(dz) = 1, w h ere P is the distribution function of Z:
Since there is only one good available in each period, we can think of its current price as always being 1. Then assuming constant returns to scale and competitive conditions, if w, is the wage rate per "effective" unit of labor at time t and r, is one plus the interest rate (net of depreciation), W t+1 = w(k,,z,+,)=f(k,,z,+,)-f, (k,,z,+,) . kv r t+ 1 = r(k,, zt+ 1) =f,(k,, z,, 1).
We also assume (A3) f is twice continuously differentiable. For each k > 0 and z E Z we have f(k, z) > 0, r(k, z) > 0, w(k, z) > 0, w,(k, z) > 0, and r,(k, z) < 0.
We also assume limk+m r(k, z) < 1 and lim,+, r(k, z) = co any z E Z.
We need three specialized assumptions. The first will enable us to prove the existence of an ergodic set for k other than (O}.3 If I is the total supply of "effective" labor units per period, let
Let "lim" stand for "lim,,+,, ." Then (A4) For at least one j, given any sequence {(a(n), a*(n))} with lim(a(n), a*(n)) = (0, 0), if lim u,(a(n), a*(n), j)/u,(a(n), a*(n), j) = Dc), we must have lim a*(n)/a(n) = 00. Also, limk10 a(k, z) E [0, a~) any z E 2, and lim,jO w(k, z)/w(k, z') E (0, 00) any z, z' E Z.
The first part of this assumtion requires that if we graph the isoquant map for U, moving through the positive orthant toward the origin, the marginal rate of substitution must not diverge to co unless the path we follow converges to the c,(j) axis. Homothetic utility functions, for instance, satisfy this restriction (given (Al)). CES production functions with elasticity of substitution > 1 will satisfy the second part of the assumption.
In order to prove the existence of an equilibrium transition function with several essential properties in Section II, we need (4 d[r(k, z) 
where K is a bounded interval to be defined shortly. This assumption ensures that an additional dollar's worth of saving at time t enlarges property income at time t + 1 regardless of the value zl+ 1 takes (provided k, E K). A production function of the formf(k, z) = z *f*(k) withf*(.)
Cobb-Douglas or CES with elasticity of substitution > 1 will satisfy (AS).
Assumptions (Al) to (A5) are sufficient to establish the existence of at least one invariant measure for the economy's equilibrium transition function v. The next assumption insures that the number of ergodic sets for each such u is finite and that none contain two or more cyclic subsets.
(A6) z' > z impZies f(k, z') >f(k, z), r(k, z') > r(k, z), and w(k, z') > w(k, z) all k > 0; z, z' E Z. z' has a continuous density function p, and p(z) > 0 all z E z.
Any production function of the form f(k, z) = z -f*(k) withf*(.) having conventional "neoclassical properties" will satisfy (A6).
3 Iff(0, z) = 0 all z E Z, then (0) is one ergodic set for our economy. We will not devote any attention to this particular ergodic set, however.
At the start of period t the state variable k,-, summarizes the past history of the economy relevant for determining w, . I,(j) each j. Let y: R* --f RJ be y(k, z) = w(k, z) . (l,(l),..., l,(J)). (4) Provided young families at time t know z! as they decide on c,(j) all j, k, depends on y, = y(k,-, , ZJ and expectations. We assume that all such families know yt and use g: RJ + R with g(y,) = k,
to predict k,. 4 Then assuming that no family's net worth can ever become negative and that families attempt to maximize their expected utility, each family at time t chooses c,(j) to solve subject to:
Suppose that Y(Y~, g) = k, (6) gives the actual value of k, if all families base their expectations on g. Then the next section shows that for the sets KC R and Y c RJ defined below there is at least one g: RJ + R such that (i) g(Y) c K; (ii) y(K x 2) c K and (iii) g(y) = y(y, g) all y E Y. Thus for capital-to-labor ratios in K, the income vector for young families must lie in Y. For all income vectors in Y, however, anticipated next-period capital-to-labor ratios will again be in K and the anticipations will be borne out exactly.
To construct the sets Y and K we need two lemmas. LEMMA 1. There exists k, E (0, 03) such that 0 < k < k, implies y( y(k, z), g) < k, any g: RJ + R and all z E Z.
' Notice that k, is not a stochastic variable here. Notice also that there is no benefit to one family of using observations of y,-, any s > 1 in predicting k, (unless it knows other families do). The same kL E (0, k,)' works for any g: Y -+ K. We fix kL, k,,, K and Y as they are defined in the lemmas.
II. EQUILIBRIUM
The operator y (see line (6)) associates with each function g: Y+ K a second function g* =r(8) (7) with g*(y) = y( y, g) all y E Y. Each fixed point for f defines an equilibrium (with rational expectations) for our model: if all families' expectations are given by g, the actual evolution of the economy is governed by g* = T(g). It is not difficult to prove that r must have at least one such fixed point. 6 In order to complete the analysis of steady states in Section III, however, we seek a fixed point g = r(g) which is continuous and strictly monotone.
Our argument, therefore, requires several steps. Letting Y and K be as in Section I, and letting A = (A, ,..., A,), define Although r does not necessarily take G(E) into itself, we construct a continuous operator, Y, that does. For each E > 0 the new function must have a fixed point on G(E). We show that with the correct choice of E, however, all fixed points of !P on G(E) must also be fixed points of K ' Although we are assuming that (A6) holds as we define ?;(j) and ye(j), we could avoid the need to do that by defining y,(j) = iv*&) ' I,(j) , where ~'(4,) = MinzGz w(k,, z), etc. The same applies later in the paper (until Section III) and in the Appendix.
'To see this, let H={g:Y+K}. Then H is compact in the topology of pointwise convergence and r is continuous on H with that topology.
If g E H and g* =r( g), g*(y) < k, all y E Y by Lemma 1. If g(y) = k,, the proof of Lemma 2 can be modified to show g*(y) > k,. regardless of the choice of y E Y. Thus, T(8H) c H. So, F has a fixed point on H.
First we establish three properties of any g* = I( g) with g E G(E). Lemma 4 shows that each g* is continuous (with respect to the conventional Euclidean metric). Lemmas 5 and 6 will enable us to prove that the fixed points of r and Y are the same. From this point forward E* will refer to the constant derived in Lemma 6.
We need one more lemma before we can turn our attention to Y.
LEMMA 7. r is continuous (with respect to 1). 11) on G(E*).
We define Y as follows. Let y, be as in Lemma 2, and let g* = T( g) with g E G(E*). Suppose y(6) = ( yL( 1) + 6, y, (2) We also have LEMMA 9 . Y is continuous (with respect to II-i/) on G(E*).
Since Y is continuous, !P(G(s*)) c G(F*), and G(E*) is convex and compact, Schauder's fixed-point theorem (see Smart (201) proves that there is at least one g = !P( g) E G(E*). The following proposition shows that g = T(g) as well. PROPOSITION 1. g = Y(g) E G(E*) implies g =T( g). Thus, there is at least one g E G(E*) such that g = r(g).
If g E G(E*), then g is continuous and nondecreasing. In fact, Lemma 5 shows that g = r( g) E G(E*) implies g must be increasing (on Y).
If g = T(g) E G(E*) and if all families use g to predict the next-period aggregate capital stock, their behavior will bear their expectations out. So, if for each Bore1 set A c R, u(k, A) = Pr{ g(y(k 4) E A L (14) then u will define a transition function for the economy consistent with rational expectations on the part of all consumers. The number u(k, A) gives the probability that if k, = k, k,, 1 will be an element of the set A. The invariant measures for u are the topic of Section III.
Notice that our equilibrium expectation functions g = r(g) E G(E*) contrast to solutions of Arrow-Debreu-Bewley (see [ 1, 3, 51 ) general equilibrium models if our consumers have different utility functions or labor endowments. For, suppose consumers are homogeneous. Then with a complete set of futures markets (for labor, investment securities, and output) all young workers at time t will save the same amount, buy even shares of output at time t + 1 in all contingencies, agree to supply the same amount of labor in each contingency, and buy the same share of each investment security. Futures prices must adjust so that the capital stock, labor supply, and total sale of output will be the same at time t + 1 regardless of the value zl+, takes. In this situation there will be an Arrow-Debreu-Bewley equilibrium corresponding to each of our equilibria.
If consumers are heterogeneous, on the other hand, the equilibria of the two types of model will differ. With a complete set of futures markets, a highly risk averse family might at time t trade some of its next-period purchasing power contingent on the event of a favorable zI+, to a less cautious family for extra purchasing power contingent on the event of an unfavorable zt+ 1. In our model that cannot happen. Thus our equilibria will typically differ from those of a traditional general equilibrium model unless all families are identical.
III. STEADY STATES
If all families use g = r( g) E G(E*) to compute their expectations, v (defined in line (14)) gives the actual transition function for the aggregate capital stock. We are now ready to prove that v has a finite number of ergodic sets in K and that associated with each such ergodic set Ei there is a unique stationary distribution function Di. Notice that if K** = KU (k,, co), the proof of Lemma 1 shows k, E K** implies k,,, E K some finite s with probability 1. The proof of Lemma 2 shows that any k' E (0, kL) will work as a lower bound for K, with (k', kL) being a collection of transitory states. Thus, if
the ergodic sets for v on K, {E, ,..., E,,,}, are the ergodic sets for v on K*.
Since g E G(E*), K is an invariant set for U. Since g E G(E*) is continuous, Grandmont and Hildenbrand [S] establish the existence of at least one invariant measure for u on K, therefore. However, we will make the following argument to show that v has only a finite number of ergodic sets in K and that none decompose into two or more cyclic subsets.
We can easily establish that v(k, .) is a probability measure and u(., A) is a measurable function.
LEMMA 10. Let g = r( g) E G(e*), and let v be as in line (14) . Then v(k, .) is a probability measure for each k E K, and for each Bore1 A c K v( . . A) is a measurable function on K.
The paragraph surrounding Proposition I shows that g = r(g) E G(E*) implies g must be increasing as well as continuous. We can use that fact to prove that u has a finite number of ergodic sets in K.
PROPOSITION II. Suppose g = I( g) E G(E*) and v is as deflned in line (14) . Then there are a finite number of ergodic sets E, ,..., E, c K for v.
Provided no Ei can be decomposed into two or more cyclic subsets, with each Ei we can associate a unique stationary distribution function Di.
The proof requires Lemma 10 and the theorems contained in Chapter 5 of Doob [6] . We will prove that no Ei can be decomposed into two or more cyclic subsets in a moment. Define 46 z) = dY(k z)). (16) Then y is strictly increasing in both arguments, so the same is true for x. As Fig. I shows, Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that x(k,, ZJ > k, and x(k,, zv) < k,,. Because of strict monotonicity, the x-curves for z = zL and zcj do not touch at any k, E K. In the diagram there are two ergodic sets: E, = [e, e*] and E, = [e***, e**** 1. Proposition II proves there must be at least one.
The with probability 1 as s --t co. Thus, k, E K (or K*) implies the economy will end up in one ergodic set or the other with probability 1.
Once in an ergodic set such as E,, k will oscillate systematically among the cyclic subsets of E, if two or more such subsets exist. In the latter case there will be one stationary distribution D,, for each cyclic set. If there are n cyclic sets, C, ,..., C, c E,, samplings at n-period intervals will fall in Ci with frequencies determined by D,i. We rule out such a situation using assumption (A6).
PROPOSITION III. Let g = r(g) E G(E*), and let v be as in line (14) . Let E c K be ergodic. Then E catt have only one cyclic subset of positive measure.
Thus, if k, E K*, we know that with probability 1 k,,, will enter an ergodic set E E {E, ,..., EN} with Ei c K all i at some finite s. If k,,, e E, then k,,,, E E with probability 1 for each s* > s. There will be a single distribution D associated with E such that J, D(dk) gives the frequency with which realizations k, + s, s > 0 will fall in any Bore1 set A c E over the very long run.' ' Let u"'(k, A) = u(k, A) and LI'~+')(~,
all i > 1. Then .r, D(dk) = lim,,,* t;"'(k, A) any Bore1 A c E is a second way of looking at the role of D.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have proven the existence of an equilibrium transition function v for our economy consistent with rational expectations on the part of all households. We also have shown that with each such u we can associate N ergodic sets Ei (with 0 < N < co) and accompanying stable, unique stationary distribution functions Di.
Although the random shocks in our model are intertemporally independent, Lemma 5 shows that for any equilibrium g E G(E*) we cannot have gj+(y) = 0 any y E Y and j, so non-serially correlated sequences of outcomes {k,, k,,,,...} are impossible.8 Thus, our model complements work done on "business-cycle models": models in the latter category generally study the role of shortsightedness or "nonrationality" (see, for example, Samuelson [ 191) or incompletely revealed information (see, for example, Lucas [ 121 or [13] ) in generating serially dependent outcome sequences from random demand shocks. Our shocks occur on the supply side of the model, but they generate serially dependent outcomes in spite of complete "rationality" in terms of behavior and expectations on the part of all market participants. Step 1. Let cU = w(kL, zU) . 1,( 1) + r(k,, zU) . s. Then c*(z) < cU all z E z.
(Al) and first-order conditions show MRS(c, , ccl) = u,(c, 9 CL,. l)/%(C,, C", 1) 2 E [u, (c, 3 ~(4, l)IIE[M, 9 44~ 111 3 r(k, , zd anyk, .limr(k, , r, ) =~. So,limMRS(c,,c,) =co.Letr=r(k,,r,),r*= r(k,, zU), w = w(kL, zL), and w* = w(k,. , zU). Note that yL ( 1) Step 2. co = lim r*s/w = I + lim(s/k,) . lim(w*/w) . lim a(k,, zc). So, (A4) implies lim s/k, = co. Thus, lim Y(y,(k,), g)/k, > lim s/k, = 00. So, there exists k, E (0, ku) with y(yL(kJ, g) > k, if g(yL(kL)) = k,. m 3. Proof of Lemma 3. Since G(E) is closed (see Munkres [ 16, p. 1301) it is compact by Ascoli's theorem (see [ 16, p. 2771) if it is equicontinuous. It is "equicontinuous" if for any v > 0 and y E Y there exists 6 > 0 such that g E G(E), y' E Y, and Maxj ] yj -yJ ( < 6 implies ) g(y) -g( y')i < v.
Fix any q > 0. Suppose y, y' E Y. Define y* = (VT,..., yJ*) with y? = Min{ yj, yj}. Define y** withyT* =Max(yj,yj}.
LetgE G(E). Theng(y*)< g(v), g(y') < gcy**>* We have y*, y** E Y. Suppose Maxi ] yj -yj ] < 6 f q/(J . E). Then MaxjIyj*-y~*l (6. SO, Ig(y)-g(y')(~g(y**)-g(y*)< 6-J. &=v. Thus G(E) is equicontinuous. Step 1. Let u,,, 24,*, and uz2 be the partial derivatives of u(c,(j), c,(j), j) if c,(j) = r'. (y7 -c,(j)) + t3 . Z,(j), r'= r( g( y*), z", and 3 = w( g(y*), 23. Differentiating first-order conditions for c,(j), E[u,, -2 . r'. u,~ + 7 r uzz] de,(j) = q-r'. U12 + F2 * u12] dyj at each y* E [y,y + d) if dyj > 0. Then (Al) shows dc,(j)/dy, < 1. So, gTt (y*) = 1 -dc,(j)/dyj > 0.
Step 2. Thus, gF'(y*) > 0 each y* E [ y, y + d). Since g E G(E) and u is twice continuously differentiable, gj*' is continuous at each such y*. So, g*(y+d')-g*(y)>Min,,,t,,,+d,1g~t(y*).6' > 0 any A'E (0,A) with A; = 6'. 1 6. Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose g(y + A) -g(y) = 6 . E and g E G(E). Then gT(y*) = E all y* E [ y, y + A). Let y = (y, ,..., yJ) be the vector of incomes for young families now, and let k = g(y). Let s, = y, -c,(m) all m, and let s=CL=is,,,.
Then s, > 0 all m and s = k if g(y) = g*(y). Let g(y) = g*(Y).
Step 1. Let ?= r(k,, zU). Assumption (A5) implies r(k, z) + r,(k, z) . k > 0 all (k, z) E K x 2. Thus there exists r* > r such that (r*/(r* + 1)) . r(k, z) + r,(k, z) -k > 0 all (k, z) E K x 2. Fix E = 1 + r*.
Step 2. Set dvj = dx > 0 and dyi = 0 all i #j.
Let dsj =dx + (r* . sj/s) dx and ds, = (r* . SJS) dx all i fj. Then ds = Ci= 1 ds, = E . dx and ds, > 0 all m.
Step 3. Let r = r( g( y), z), where z is the next-period realization of Z: Then d(r f s,)/dyj = r(ds,/dyj) + s,rl g,?(y) > (rr*s,/s) t s, r, E = E . [ (r*/c) . r t rl k] . (s,,,/s) > 0 by Step 1 with strict inequality when s, > 0.
Step 4.
Step 3, (Al), and the first-order conditions for c, (m) show that if y changes to y + d', where A' E (0, A), and if each family's saving is changed by 8:) where 8: = 6' t (r*sj/s) 6' or 4 = (r*sJs) 6' when i fj, then provided 6' = A; is small enough, each family of type m will want to decrease the change in its saving if s, > 0 or m = j and leave it unchanged otherwise.
Suppose SC is the desired change in saving for family m following the change from y to y t A' above. Suppose C",= 1 8% > CA= i 8,. Let k" = k t C",=,Sz and k'=ktCJ,=,am.
Then k* > k' so (A5) implies r(k*, z) a k* > r(k', z) . k' all z E Z (assuming k*, k' E K). Thus for some m we have r(k*, z) . (s, t Sg) > r(k', z) . (s, t 8;) any L E Z. So, the arguments above show the first-order conditions of family m are being violated at s, + Sz, a contradiction. So, Ci= i 8: > xi= i & is not possible.
If 0 < Ci= i 82 < C",= i Sk, the first paragraph of Step 4 shows 8: < S:, all m, with strict inequality for at least one m. Thus, g*( y + d') -g*(y) = ~~=&<~;~,&=&a I 7. Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose g, g E G(E*) and /I g -El) = 6. Let g* = f(g) and g* = r(g).
Maximizing over (k, z) E K x Z, let rT = Max{ lr,(k, z)l} and W: = Max{w,(k, z)}. Let si be the saving of young household i at present given g, and let fi be the same given g. Then first-order conditions show 1 si -Ci 1 < 6x for all i where x = k,r: + lwf. So, 11 g* -g* II< 6 . x . J. Thus, r is continuous. I
